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Notes
BENEFIT AS LEGAL COMPENSATION FOR THE TAKING
OF PROPERTY UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
Man's great progress in the development of the mechanical
arts and scientific research have caused innumerable legal prob-
lems to arise. With the great advance of the automobile in-
dustry came the pressing demand for larger smooth-surfaced
highways; the great development of steam and electric railroads
has necessitated rights of way for the tracks; the progress of
the oil industry has resulted in the construction of long pipe
lines through which oil is transported for hundreds of miles';
the increased functions and burdens of governmental agencies
have increased the need for public buildings. The new conveni-
ences of man are often concerned with great problems of public
interest. Roads, tracks, pipe lines, and municipal buildings are
all so affected with public interest'that their establishment is de-
manded, even if the rights and wishes of a minority must be par-
tially disregarded. The power of eminent domain lends it-
self to aid the public in this respect. However, the rights of the
minority should not be entirely disregarded, and ample safe-
guards must be given to protect them from the possibility of un-
reasonable action on the part of the majority. A conflict be-
tween the rights of the minority and the wishes of the public
generally has arisen in the question of benefits accruing to the
residue of an owner's land by reason of a public improvement,
after a part of that parcel has been taken for the public im-
provement. The landowner resents an assertion by the public
generally that he should not retain these benefits, and feels that
the forced relinquishment of part of his land should be fully
compensated for in money. The public, on the other hand, at-
tempts to convince the landowner that the enhancement of the
value of his remaining land is not due to any efforts of his own,
but merely accrues to him from the chance decision of the pub-
lic, through its officials, to locate the improvement near his land,
and that this benefit accruing to his remaining land should at
least be considered when compensation is made to him for the
part of the land that is taken. The problem of whether bene-
fits should be held to constitute legal compensation for the tak-
ing of property under the power of eminent domain is dealt
with in one way or another in every state of the United States.
Different conceptions of the nature of rights to property, na-
ture of eminent domain, compensation, and benefits may account
for the varied answers to the problem. The true solution of the
problem must rest upon a foundation so solid and unimpeach-
able that worthy criticisms of it cannot be made.
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In treating the question of whether benefits can be considered
as legal compensation for the taking of property under the
power of eminent domain several questions are presented re-
garding the fundamental conceptions of the ownership of prop-
erty. The nature of the ownership of property must be care-
fully considered in this problem because conflicting conceptions
of the right to property must be expected to arise whenever the
social group attempts to exercise a power over individually
owned property. Such a conflict of individual and social inter-
ests arises when the power of eminent domain is exercised by
the state to deprive an individual owner of all or part of his
property. It is true that private property cannot be taken un-
der the power of eminent domain without making compensation
to the owner,' but the conflict often arises as to the nature of
the compensation and whether benefits accruing to the residue
of the property after part is taken by reason of the improve-
ment, can be legally set off against the payment of damages for
the part taken.2
In order to determine the question as stated, the nature of the
right to property ownership must be considered. Uninformed
persons often erroneously maintain that ownership of property
includes complete and exclusive control of it without limitation.
The fiction of this contention is evident when it is considered
that property is legally and effectually controlled to a certain
degree by the police power, power of taxation, power of emi-
nent domain and other powers inherent in the government of
the state. The truth of this is so apparent that a citation of
authority for it would be mere superfluity. But the limitations
on the ownership of property exercised by the state are not to
be carried so far as to result in oppression to the owners of prop-
erty. Therefore, it is with some justification that the owners
of property, part of which is taken from them under eminent
domain, raise a doubt as to whether benefits accruing to the
residue of the property by reason of the improvement are to be
considered as legal compensation to be set off from the damages
to which the owner is entitled for the part taken.
In order to arrive at any conclusion on the problem of whether
benefits can be considered as legal compensation, the very nature
of the power of eminent domain and its effect on the right to
hold property must be considered. Mr. John Lewis in his
treatise on the LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN concludes that,
'Const. U. S. Amendment V.
The right to just compensation is now guaranteed by the constitutions
of practically all of the states, and even in absence of such provision in the
ozganic law, the right to compensation has been recognized by the courts
as a fundamental right founded on natural justice. 20 C. T. 643.220 C. J. 813.
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Eminent domain is not the nature of any estate or inter-
est in property, reserved or otherwise acquired, but sim-
ply a power to appropriate individual property as the pub-
lic necessities require, and which pertains to sovereignty as
a necessary, constant and inextinguishable attribute. 3
Reasoning from this well considered definition, it is apparent
that the power of eminent domain is absolute in the sovereignty
of the state, and as a natural attribute of that sovereignty does
operate as an effective limitation on the owner's control of his
property. The welfare of the social group is given first consid-
eration even if that practise results in an inconvenience to the
individual. The exercise of the power results in a forced taking
of property from an owner who may be unwilling to give it up,
but this serves to definitely illustrate that the owner's control
over his property is not unlimited.
Although the control of an owner over his property is not un-
limited, it is also true that limitations are imposed upon the
sovereign power of eminent domain by the people themselves.
The limitations upon the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main are usually included in the grant of that power by the peo-
ple to the legislative department of the government in the gen-
eral grant of legislative power. The ordinary and typical form
of that limitation is that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation," 4 but some of the later
state constitutions amplify and complicate the simple limitation
with special reference to the manner in which the limitation is
to operate. North Carolina has no express limitation by consti-
tutional provision on the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main by the legislature. The right to compensation, however,
has been worked out through other provisions in the constitu-
tions of other states which did not have the constitutional lim-
itation, the provision that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law" lending itself
for the purpose of requiring that just compensation be given
when land is taken for a public purpose.5
We are forced to realize that in providing for limitations on
the power of eminent domain, the various constitutions which
have such limitations, could not adequately define them so as
to include and determine every question that might be raised
under them. The provision for compensation sometimes mere-
ly provides for "just compensation.",, The use of that phrase
must from its very nature give rise to the issue of just what
3LEWis, op. cit. 9.
'LEWis, op. cit. 20; see also ftn. 1, above.
'Ibid. 23.
Const. U. S. Amendment V.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
is to be included within that term. The term "just com-
pensation" has no technical or purely legal significance,7 but,
on the other hand, is determined by equitable principles, and its
measure varies with the facts.8 The legal meaning of the term
"just compensation" being held to be so variable in order to in-
clude the problems arising from the facts and circumstances of
the individual case, the question of whether benefits may or may
not be set off against compensation made in damages, deter-
mines the question of whether benefits can legally be considered
as compensation at all.
Before entering into a discussion of the present status of the
law on the principal question, it would probably be helpful to
consider the nature of benefits in condemnation proceedings.
When a part of a parcel of land is taken for public use, it may
happen that the construction and maintenance of the public
work will inflict some injury on the remainder of the parcel;
or, on the other hand, it may benefit it to such an extent that the
market value of the remaining land will be greater than the value
of the whole parcel before the public improvement was made.
In order to be considered a benefit which may be set off against
damages it must be genuine and capable of estimation in money
value, it must result from the particular improvement for which
the land was taken, and it must accrue to the same parcel of
land from which the part condemned was taken.10 Benefits to
separate and independent tracts of land, other than the one part-
ly taken by the proceeding, cannot be considered as compensa-
tion.1 The benefit must attach to the land itself; benefits to
the business of the owner cannot be considered. 12 Hence, the
term "benefit" as used in eminent domain means a real enhance-
ment to the residue of the land, accruing to that residue from
the improvement that necessitated a condemnation of part of
the original tract.
Granting that the principal question has been raised because
of the great movement for increased public improvements, and
having considered some of the principles involved in the very
nature of the right to property, the power of eminent domain,
and the question of benefits, we will now enter into a considera-
tion of the present status of the law in the United States on the
question of whether benefits can be considered as legal com-
pensation for the taking of property under the power of emin-
I Des Moines Laundry v. Des Moines (1924) 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N. W.
486.
'N. Y., 0. & W. R. Co. v. Livingston (1924) 238 N. Y. 300, 144 N. E. 589.
'10 R. C. L. 158.
1010 R. C. L. 158.
f9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 980 et seq.
'Hamilton v. Pittsburg R. Co. (1899) 190 Pa. St. 51, 42 AtI. 369.
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ent domain. In our consideration of the present law, we find
a conflict on the principal question. Some states by their con-
stitutions absolutely forbid the setting off of benefits from com-
pensation in certain cases and require that the payment of com-
pensation be in money.' 3 In other states the constitutions pro-
vide that there must be "just compensation" given for the land
taken, but are silent as to allowing the set-off of benefits. 4 In
some of the latter states a statute allows the set-off of benefits
in certain cases," but statutes of other states prohibit the set-
off of benefits when the constitution of the state is silent on that
point." Because the scope of this paper will be limited strictly
to a consideration of the principal question, no attempt will be
made to distinguish between general and special benefits, nor
will any of the intricate minor problems which may pertain to
the principal question be considered any further than is neces-
sary for a determination of the principal question. With this
limitation of the scope of this paper in mind, we will enter into
a consideration of the present law of some of the states of the
United States regarding the legality of setting off benefits from
compensation, with the hope that from the conflict and maze of
different rules, we may extract the correct one for discussion.
In some states the constitutions expressly provide that in cer-
tain specified cases full compensation shall be made for the land
taken, without any deduction on account of benefits accruing
to the residue.'7 In some of these constitutions the provision
applies only in case of the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main by certain public service corporations, as in Arkansas,18
where municipal corporations are not limited Dy the provision,
but in Alabama and some other states the constitutional limita-
tion was applied to municipal corporations as well as public
service corporations in their use of the power of eminent do-
main." , A constitutional provision prohibiting the setting off of
benefits from compensation is not violated by a statute which
authorizes the assessment of the cost of an improvement against
abutting property according to the benefit derived by such prop-
"See ftn. 17, post.
"See ftn. 28, post.
" See ftn. 35, post.
" See ftn. 39, post.
"Alabama, Const. Ala. (1868) art. 13, sec. 5, but see Const. Ala. (1901)
art. 1, see. 23; Arkansas, Const. Ark. art. 12, sec. 9, and Kirby's dig. sec.
2953; California, Const. Cal. art. 1, sec. 14; Iowa, Const. Iowa, art. 1, see.
18; Kansas, Const. Kan. art. 12, sec. 4; N. Dakota, Const. N. Dak. art. 1,
see. 14; Ohio, Const. Ohio art. 1, see. 19; S. Carolina, Const. S. Car. art. 9,
sec. 20; Washington, Const. Wash. art. 1, see. 16.
"Paragould v. Milner (1914) 114 Ark. 334, 170 S. W. 78.
0 Faust v. Huntsville (1888) 83 Ala. 279, 3 So. 771.
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erty, where other provisions of the constitution authorize as-
sessments to raise funds for that purpose.20 But Alabama seems
to have changed its constitution in respect to the denial of the
right to set off benefits, for in Constitution of Alabama (1901)
art. 1 sec. 23, provision is made for compensation, but no spe-
cific reference is made to the setting off of benefits. Under the
Code of Alabama (1923) see. 7489, provision is made prohibiting
the reduction of compensation because of "incidental" benefits
which may accrue to the residue of the land. However, the Acts
of Alabama (1927) p. 492, provided that even though compen-
sation cannot be reduced because of "incidental" benefits, the
condemnation commissioners or jury in fixing the compensa-
tion to be awarded in condemnation of public highways, "may"
take into consideration the value of the enhancement to the re-
maining lands of the owner if that enhancement is due to the
location of the highway there. A recent case has construed the
word "may" to mean "must" in the Alabama act of 1927 so as
to prevent inequalities in the administration of the law.21 The
provision in the Alabama Constitution (1901) art. 14 sec. 235,
provides that when municipal and other corporations have exer-
cised the power of eminent domain, the compensation, "to be as-
certained as may be provided by law," must be given. Hence,
the Code of Alabama (1923) sec. 7489, as amended by the Acts
of Alabama (1927) p. 429, seems to be an exercise of the power
given to the legislature to provide what should constitute com-
pensation by statute. The amendment of 1927 merely shows a
specific exception to sec. 7489 of the 1923 Code of Alabama. The
amendment of 1927 was held to be constitutional in a recent
case.22 With this review of the change that has taken place in
the Alabama law in mind, we may well consider the reasoning
upon which the old provision of the Constitution of Alabama of
1868, which forbade the set-off of benefits, was based.
The case of Alabama and Florida R. R. Co. v. Burkett" was
probably an important factor in causing the prohibition of the
setting off of benefits to be embodied in the Constitution of Ala-
bama of 1868. When this case was decided, the Alabama Con-
stitution of 1865 was in operation, which merely provided that
compensation should be made, no reference then being made to
the question of benefits. The Court quoted from Woodfold v.
Nashville R. R. Co.2 4 which case held that compensation must
"Hutchins v. Hanna (1917) 179 Iowa 912, 162 N. W. 225.
Conecuh County v. Carter (Ala. 1930) 126 So. 132.
Rudder v. Limestone County (Ala. 1930) 125 So. 670.
(1868) 42 Ala. 83.
(1852) 2 Swan (Tenn.) 422.
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be made in money irrespective of any benefits accruing to the
land. This Tennessee court said,
If the owner's remaining lands are appreciated, and his
facilities of travel and trade increased by the improvement,
these are benefits to which he is entitled, with the commu-
nity in general, and for which he has to pay in common
with others in taxes and other burthens. But there can be
no good reason why any more should be taken from him
than others for these common benefits.
The Tennessee court does not clearly distinguish between gen-
eral or common benefits and special benefits. This reasoning
was adopted by the Alabama court in 1868 and was probably
a factor in causing the constitutional provision forbidding the
setting off of benefits to be enacted in 1868. The constitution
of 1868 remained in force until it was supplanted by the consti-
tution of 1875 which made no reference to the setting off of
benefits. The Constitution of Alabama of 1901, the present
constitution of that state, is also silent on the question of bene-
fits. It seems, therefore, that so far as constitutional provi-
sions are concerned, Alabama has receded from its position of
strictly prohibiting the setting off of benefits by constitutional
provision in cases of lands condemned by corporations, and has
allowed the legislature to control the question by statute. The
amendment of 1927 has at least expressed one exception to the
general rule of that state that benefits cannot be set off from
damages, that exception being that benefits will be allowed to
be set off in case of lands taken for public highways. 25
In Arkansas, under a constitutional provision 26 which pro-
hibited the setting off of benefits when lands were condemned
by corporations, the provision was construed so as not to apply
when the taking was by a municipal corporation.2 T  In the light
of this holding it is apparent that the court's interpretation of
the constitutional provision involved was not presuming to de-
clare that "benefit" could not be considered as legal compensa-
tion for property taken by eminent domain, but was merely ex-
pressing a reluctance to give private corporations a power of
eminent domain quite as extensive over the property rights of
individuals as they were willing to grant to municipal corpora-
tions.
Many constitutions provide that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation being made"
and contain no provision as to the deduction of benefits in case
" Ala. Acts 1927, p. 492.
"See ftn. 17, above.
" Paragould v. Milner (1914) 114 Ark. 334, 170 S. W. 78.
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only a part of the tract is taken and there are such benefits.
Under such a provision, it is held in some jurisdictions that
the legislature may authorize or the courts may allow the bene-
fits accruing to the residue of the land from the improvement
to be set off against the value of the part actually taken or from
the entire compensation. 28 The State of Texas is typical of ajurisdiction in which special benefits are allowed to be set off
against damages made in compensation for the land taken. Re-
vised Civil Statutes of Texas (1925) art. 3265 sec. 3 provides:
Where only a portion of a tract or parcel of a person's
real estate is condemned, the commissioners shall estimate
the injuries sustained and the benefits received thereby by
the owner; whether the remaining portion is increased or
diminished in value by reason of such condemnation, and
the extent of such increase or diminution, and shall assess
the damages accordingly.
In section 4 of this statute it is provided that injuries that
the owner sustains or receives in common with the community
generally and which are not peculiar to him, shall not be con-
sidered by the commissioners. A rather recent decision has put
an interpretation upon the Texas statute, holding that benefits,
if greater than damages to the land not condemned, cannot be
set off against the value of the land condemned.2 This is the
present rule in Texas. It differs from the rule which prevailed
there not so many years ago. In 1895 it was held that the Bill
of Rights of Texas, sec. 17, in providing that "adequate com-
pensation" shall be made for private land taken for public use,
requires the payment to the owner of the intrinsic value of the
land taken, without reference to the benefits he may derive from
the improvement.30 The change of the law of Texas on this
point may be significant of a trend in the states to allow a set-
ting off of benefits. The State of Vermont as early as 1851 pro-
vided for setting off of benefits by statute. In that state it was
held in 1851 that the statute (Rev. St. c. 20 sec. 53; Comp. St.
c. 22 sec. 67) which provides that in estimating damages that
may be sustained by any person owning or interested in lands
by reason of laying out or altering any highway, the benefit
which such person may receive thereby shall be taken into con-
sideration, is not repugnant to that article of the constitution
of the state (Const. Vt. pt. I art. 2) which provides that when-
ever any person's property is taken for the use of the public,
20 C. J. 813.
= Wilson v. Newton County (Tex. 1925) 269 S. W. 227.
Travis Co. v. Trogden (1895) 88 Tex. 302, 31 S. W. 358.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss4/5
NOTES
the owner ought to receive an equivalent in moneyA1 Texas
and Vermont are indicative of a class of states which allow the
setting off of benefits by statute, the constitution of those states
being silent on that question.
On the other hand, Indiana has consistently held to the posi-
tion of not allowing the setting off of benefits and prohibiting
such setting off by express statute. The Constitution of Indi-
ana now merely provides that "just compensation" shall be made
for the taking of property under power of eminent domain.
But a statute in Indiana provides that, "in estimating the dam-
ages . . . no deduction shall be made for any benefits that
may result from such improvement.32 But this provision pro-
hibiting the setting off of benefits does not apply to municipal
corporations in their exercise of the power of eminent domain.3
The exception to the Indiana statute quoted above probably is
indicative of the fact that the statute prohibits the setting off of
benefits, not because of any conclusion that benefits are not real-
ly legal compensation, but again because of a reluctance to grant
to private or public service corporations quite as extensive a
power of eminent domain as the legislature is willing to grant
to municipal corporations.
In Missouri, the constitutional provision provides: "
private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation. Such compensation shall be ascer-
tained by a jury or a board of commissioners of not less than
three freeholders in such a manner as may be prescribed by
law; and until the same shall be paid to the owner, or into court
for the owner, the property shall not be disturbed or the pro-
prietary rights of the owner therein divested. ' ' 3 4 Since the con-
stitution does not mention the setting off of benefits, it would
be expected that a specific statute would determine whether or
not benefits should be set off in the finding of the damages. How-
ever, no general statute covering the setting off of benefits in
all cases of condemnation of property is found in Missouri. In
place of a general statute covering the problem, special statutes
treat the question of whether benefits can be set off. When the
power of eminent domain is given to a municipal or private
corporation by specific statute, that statute provides whether or
not benefits can be considered as compensation 5 An example
of such a special statute relating to setting off of benefits is
found in the St. Louis City Charter art. 21, sec. 6, which, after
Livermore v. Town of Jamaica (1851) 23 Vt. 361.
mInd. Stat. (Burns, 1926) sec. 7685.
Ibid., sec. 7681.
'
4 Const. Mo. art. 2 sec. 21.
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 7223.
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earlier sections of the charter grant to the city a power of emi-
nent domain, provides:
At any time after the commissioners file their report the
city may pay into court the amount of damages assessed,
less benefits, if any, and thereupon it shall be entitled to
take possession of or damage the property . .
It was held as early as 1857 that under the Missouri consti-
tutional provision providing that "private property could not
be taken for public use without just compensation" it was com-
petent for the legislature to declare that, in assessing the com-
pensation, the benefits to be derived by the landowner from the
public use of his land should be taken into account.38 This case
held that section 17 of article 2 of the general act of 1845 [Rev.
Code (1845) p. 974] providing that in assessing the damages
sustained by a person by reason of a road's passing over his
land "the commissioners shall take into consideration the advan-
tages as well as the disadvantages of the road to such person"
is in harmony with the constitution. Missouri decisions have
consistently followed the early law that the setting off of bene-
fits was not unconstitutional. 87
In Mississippi, judicial decision has construed the constitu-
tional provision to prohibit the giving of anything except money
as compensation for the taking of property under the power
of eminent domain. These decisions, of course, refuse to con-
sider benefits accruing to the residue of the land as part of the
compensation. The Constitution of Mississippi of 1890 provides
in article 1, section 17,
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for pub-
lic use, except on due compensation being first made to the
owner thereof in a manner to be prescribed by law . . .
This same provision was found in the Mississippi Constitu-
tion of 1832 art. 1, sec. 13. This provision was construed by
four early Mississippi cases.83 In Brown v. Beatty (cited in
ftn. 38) a provision of the charter of the Mississippi Central
Railroad -Company which allowed condemnation commissioners
to take benefits into consideration as compensation for lands
condemned by the railroad was held to be violative of the Bill
'Newby v. Platte County (1857) 25 Mo. 258.
State ex rel. Farren v. St. Louis (1876) 62 Mo. 244; In re North Ter-
race Park (1898) 147 Mo. 259, 48 S. W. 860; Rourke v. Holmes St. Ry. Co.
(Mo. App. 1915) 177 S. W. 1102.
'Brown v. Beatty (1857) 34 Miss. 227; Isom v. Miss. Cent. R. R. Co.
(1858) 36 Miss. 300; Penrice v. Wallace (1859) 37 Miss. 172; N. Orleans
R. Co. v. Maye (1860) 39 Miss. 374.
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of Rights and was unconstitutional. In that case the Court
said:
He was entitled to be paid in money. It was clearly as
incompetent for the legislature to prescribe in what he
should be paid, as to prescribe how much or how little he
should receive. Manifestly a party whose property has been
taken and appropriated to a public use, in the construction
of a railroad, cannot be compelled to receive, as compensa-
tion, the estimated enhancement in the value of the remain-
ing property. The cash value and the actual damage are
the true standards by which to determine the compensation
to which, in such cases, the party is entitled.
The three cases following Brown v. Beatty (cited in ftn. 38)
affirmed the doctrine of that case. The rule of these early cases
is now embodied in a statute of Mississippi which declares:
The defendant is entitled to due compensation, not only
for the value of the property to be actually taken as speci-
fied in the application, but also for damages, if any, which
may result to him as a consequence of the taking; and you
are not to deduct therefrom anything on account of the sup-
posed benefits incident to the public use for which the ap-
plication is made. 9
Thus we see that the law in Mississippi is definitely settled
on the principal question, the conclusion being that benefits are
not to be considered as legal compensation for the land taken
under the power of eminent domain.
In the research conducted in the preparation of this work, no
constitutional provision was found which expressly authorized
benefits to be set off from damages. Quite the opposite was
found in some cases, the constitutions of some states having
provisions which expressly prohibited the setting off of bene-
fits.40 The judicial construction of the Arkansas provision that
the prohibition against the setting off of benefits did not apply
to the condemnation of property by municipal corporations, and
the recent exception to the statutory prohibition of the setting
off of benefits in Alabama, along with the change in the posi-
tion of Texas from prohibition of the setting off of benefits to
allowing the setting off of benefits by express statute are sig-
nificant of a trend toward the recognition of benefits as legal
compensation for property taken under the power of eminent
domain. It can hardly be said that the principal question-
whether or not "benefits" are legal compensation-has been de-
" Miss. Code (Hemingway, 1927) c. 24 sec. 1571.
"See ftn. 17, above.
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termined in the negative on any general ground of dissatisfac-
tion with the theory that benefits to the residue of the land aris-
ing from the public improvement are of substantial nature so
as to allow their being set off from the damages given for the
land taken. In almost every state here considered in which
the result reached was that benefits could not be set off, that
holding was due to some special circumstance, and not because
of a real objection to considering benefits, as such, as compen-
sation. The case of Mississippi serves to illustrate this point.
The constitution provided that "due compensation" must be
paid, and early judicial interpretation construed this provision
to require payment in money, thus denying that benefits were
legal compensation. 41 The decision of Brown v. Beatty which
held a provision of a railroad charter allowing the set-off of
benefits from compensation upon lands condemned by the rail-
road to be unconstitutional illustrates that a decision in a special
kind of condemnation case could definitely shape the policy of
the state toward the setting off of benefits generally, for later
a statute of Mississippi prohibited the setting off of benefits in
any case of condemnation of lands.42 No distinction seems to
have been shown in that case between the exercise of eminent
domain by private corporations organized for gain, as a rail-
road, and the exercise of that power by municipal corporations.
From the special power of eminent domain conferred upon the
railroad, the court draws the conclusion that benefits in any case
of condemnation cannot be held to be legal compensation, and
that decision is now incorporated into a statute.48  But the law
in Arkansas and Indiana recognizes a difference between con-
demnation by a private and a public corporation. Being re-
luctant to allow private corporations organized for gain to con-
demn lands without paying full value in money, those states
prohibit the setting off of benefits in private corporation cases,
but in recognition of the need of greater public improvement
generally, municipal corporations are excepted from the provi-
sion prohibiting the setting off of benefits. It could not be said
that Arkansas and Indiana are, by these provisions, denying that
benefits are legal compensation because the provision excepting
municipal corporations from the statute is definite recognition
that benefits are legal compensation in some cases of condemna-
tion. A stronger argument for the recognition of benefits as
legal compensation is shown by the early decisions of the courts
of Vermont and Missouri that the setting off of benefits was
legal. These states have consistently held to that early view.
'Brown v. Beatty, above.
'Miss. Code (Hemingway, 1927) c. 24, sec. 1571.
"See ftn. 42, above.
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A brief summary of the development of the law of those states
considered here on the principal question will show a trend to-
ward the recognition of benefits as legal compensation in the
states that formerly prohibited the setting off of benefits. The
recent law of Alabama of 192744 providing for an exception to
the general statute against allowing the setting off of benefits is
a small breach in the wall that defends the general statutory
prohibition. The provision in Arkansas and Indiana excepting
municipal corporations from the statute prohibiting the setting
off of benefits prevents these statutes from being used as effec-
tive arguments for the proposition that benefits cannot be con-
sidered as legal compensation. The statute of Mississippi stands
alone in the contention that benefits are not legal compensation,
but when it is considered that this statute is probably founded
upon the reasoning of Brown ,v. Beatty and those cases decided
immediately after that case, all of which were cases of railroad
condemnation,45 it is doubtful whether the statute was really in-
tended to cover the set-off of benefits generally, although the ac-
tual wording of the statute would seem to indicate that it did.
The change of the law of Texas from prohibition of the setting
off of benefits formerly to the present recognition of benefits as
legal compensation is an indication of the general trend of the
states towards allowing benefits to be considered as legal com-
pensation for taking of property under eminent domain. The
general trend of the doubtful states in this direction combined
with the early recognition of benefits as legal compensation by
Vermont and Missouri seem to clearly indicate that there is no
legal basis for an argument that "benefits" are not really com-
pensation for property taken under the power of eminent do-
main. The question is one of policy, and most jurisdictions have
allowed the setting off of benefits in an honest effort to justly
distribute the cost of public improvements.
NOEL F. DELPORTE, '31.
Ala. Acts 1927, p. 492.
" See ftn. 38, above.
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